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REASSESSING THE SOPHISTICATED INSURED
EXCEPTION
Hazel Glenn Beh
Contra-insurer rules of construction, such as contra proferentem and the
reasonable expectations doctrine, can be and sometimes are displaced when
the insured is commercially sophisticated or, e.g., represented by counsel or a
broker. In recent years, such displacement has become something of a trend,
and insurers have attempted to extend the situations in which, they argue,
savvy business or other sophisticated entities should be held to the insurance
contract as written. Thus, they say that the notice-prejudice rule need not
and should not be applied when a sophisticated insured has failed to meet a
polity notice provision, and that sophisticated insureds can and should be
deemed to have waived statutory requirements imposed on insurers in certain
circumstances.
The author argues that contra-insurer rules of construction advance a
valid public policy goal and should be retained, notwithstanding the wealth,
size, power, or acumen of the insured. In some limited circumstances, however,
sophistication of the insured should be considered. If the insurance contract is
really a product ofjoint drafting, or iffactual inquiry is necessary to assess
the intent of the parties, then the insured's sophistication can be considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
The canons of insurance contract construction traditionally have favored
the insured. Chief among these rules are contra proferentem and the rea-
sonable expectations doctrine. Pro-insured canons of contract interpreta-
tion law have been justified on a variety of grounds, including the adhesive
quality of the insurance product, the parties' relative bargaining power, the
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relation of trust, the parties' asymmetric access to information, the unique
nature of insurance, and the quasi-public nature of the insurance industry.1
A few decades ago, insurers began to contest the wholesale application
of contra proferentem by arguing that in certain instances it defied com-
mon sense or fairness. Insurers argued that sophisticated insureds did not
need protective contract interpretation rules to level the playing field, and
that the justifications for applying contra proferentem were unfair to in-
surers when the parties' bargaining power was equal.
Ten years ago, Professor Jeffrey Stempel assessed the nascent sophisti-
cated insured exception.2 He observed that "courts in the 1980s acted with
increasing frequency in rejecting or modifying the ambiguity principle
when the nondrafter was a sophisticated party or was sufficiently involved
in the contract drafting process" and noted a "distinct line of cases" in this
trend.3
The sophisticated insured exception to contra proferentem continues to
percolate in insurance law, but the parameters of the exception are difficult
to define. 4 Some commentators suggest that because contra proferentem
was intended to rectify the problems of unequal bargaining power, relative
bargaining equality should justify its displacement.5 Other commentators
caution that a wholesale abandonment of contra proferentem merely be-
cause an insured enjoys a measure of wealth and power ignores the unique
reality of insurance marketing. These critics argue that rules of construc-
tion in favor of the insured should not be abandoned because, when it
comes to insurers and insureds, equality is a fiction.6
A middle ground approach, proposed ten years ago by Professor Stem-
pel, acknowledges that the sophisticated insured exception may be appro-
priate in a limited class of insurance contracts where extrinsic evidence
compels rejection of the contra-insurer rules of construction. The factors
Professor Stempel identified tend to show that the insurance contract was
1. See generally James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of
Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 995 (1992).
2. Jeffrey Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated" Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage
Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REv. 807 (1993).
3. Id. at 832. Professor Stempel also noted an increasing reticence to employ the exception.
Id. at 848. This reticence continues.
4. While it is often characterized as the "sophisticated insured defense," it is more aptly
identified as an exception to the rule of contra proferentem, rather than a defense.
5. See Michael G. Patrizio, Fables of Construction: The Sophisticated Policyholder Defense, 79
ILL. BJ. 234 (1991) (commenting that "courts have begun to recognize that a large commer-
cial policyholder, which has equal bargaining power with an insurer, should not have tradi-
tional rules of contract construction applied in its favor").
6. Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders'
Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CoNN. Is. L.J. 335, 369-71 (1998)
(discussing the "fallacy" of the sophisticated policyholder and noting that even so-called
manuscript policies derive from standard forms promulgated by insurers.)
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the product of actual bargaining between relative equals with adequate
representation, experience, and knowledge sufficient to justify rejecting
contra-insurer rules of construction.
This article explores the maturing sophisticated insured exception and
its varied applications. Recent cases suggest that courts recognizing the
exception have largely opted for Professor Stempel's functional approach.
Courts in recent years have adhered to contra-insurer rules of construction
to resolve ambiguities in most insurance contract disputes regardless of the
insured's sophistication or wealth, but have rejected such rules where -the
insured, its broker, or its attorney actually negotiated or drafted the insur-
ance contract. Many courts examine the drafting and negotiating history
to discern whether real bargaining over the disputed terms occurred before
abandoning traditional rules of construction.
Recently, insurers have advanced yet other situations where considera-
tion of the insured's sophistication may be appropriate to negate pro-
insured rules. They argue that when judging the reasonableness of an in-
sured's conduct during the performance of the insurance obligations,
sophisticated insureds should be held to a standard of reasonableness that
comports with their knowledge and experience. Savvy business entities thus
would be less readily excused by ignorance of insurance practices. For ex-
ample, when an insured fails to strictly comply with an insurance policy's
notice provisions, the modern trend is to excuse the insured where the late
notice has not prejudiced the insurer, to ameliorate the harshness of for-
feiture. However, insurers recently have argued that sophisticated insureds
should not be excused for their deficiencies because they should be diligent
about insurance matters in their business practices. Insurers also have ar-
gued that sophisticated insureds should be able to waive statutory rights,
even when insurers do not strictly comply with formal statutory waiver
requirements.
To be sure, the sophistication of parties to contracts has always been an
appropriate consideration in contract law. For example, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code allows usage of trade both to supply terms and to interpret
terms in an agreement between parties who should be knowledgeable of
such customary usage.' Thus, parties with a sophisticated knowledge of
their trade are chargeable with such knowledge whereas consumers and
parties not in the trade will not be held to such knowledge.8 Furthermore,
7. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1989) ("usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question").
8. Under U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1989), parties are subject to usage of trade "in the vocation
or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware." See 2 E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON Co rRcTs § 7.13, at 312-13 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing burden
of proof in charging one with trade usage).
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the sophisticated knowledge of the parties is relevant in contract interpre-
tation generally: "language that is ambiguous to an unsophisticated party
may not be ambiguous to a sophisticated commercial entity."9 In addition,
in balancing public policy and unconscionability with freedom of contract,
courts often indulge the right of sophisticated parties to make a bad bargain
or relinquish valuable rights with less judicial protection than is often af-
forded to ordinary consumers.' 0
Thus, in some ways, the sophisticated insured exception is unremarkable,
and merely an offshoot of traditional principles of contract construction.
However, there are fundamental differences between contracts generally
and contracts of insurance. " Thus, just as contra proferentem and reason-
able expectations, both with clear roots in contract law, have been trans-
formed with regard to insurance contracts, so too has application and con-
sideration of sophistication been adapted to the unique realm of insurance.
This article examines the justifications for holding sophisticated and un-
sophisticated insureds to differing standards and assesses the sophisticated
insured exception in its current variety of contexts. Part II explores contra-
insurer rules of insurance contract interpretation and describes an increas-
ingly principled rejection of those rules for certain sophisticated insureds.
This article posits that in the interests of equality among insureds, pre-
dictability of standardized language, and consistency of judicial outcomes,
whenever standardized insurance language is used, regardless of who of-
fered it, that language should be interpreted using traditional pro-insured
rules of construction. To do otherwise would allow insurers opportunisti-
cally to seize an advantage based on the insured's status and allow unpre-
dictable and inconsistent interpretations of standard language.
Part m identifies still other instances where insurers have made some
inroads in urging courts to consider the insured's sophistication, such as
to avoid the notice-prejudice rule and to avoid unfavorable application of
waiver and estoppel. This article concludes that a "sophisticated insured
exception" is not necessary, but instead the insured's sophistication is a
relevant factual consideration in certain contexts.
Part IV points out that considering an insured's sophistication without
principle unfairly and irrationally penalizes commercial insureds and yields
inconsistent and unpredictable results. Such consideration allows the in-
surer opportunistically to seize an advantage merely because of the in-
9. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505, 510
(Mo. 2001) (en banc).
10. See, e.g., id. at 508-09 (noting that sophisticated parties may, among other things,
contractually limit remedies and waive jury trials, and holding that they may disclaim tort
liability when provisions are clear and unambiguous).
11. See generally Fischer, supra note 1, at 1001 (arguing that the imbalance in information
best justifies pro-insured bias in judicial decisions).
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sured's status. When the dispute involves a standardized agreement, or a
statute or judicial rule of general application, then the status of the insured
should not matter. Carving out exceptions in these instances raises prob-
lems of inequality, inconsistency, and unpredictability among the insured
public and is therefore undesirable.
Considering the insured's sophistication is appropriate, however, when
it helps to resolve factual questions and does not raise issues of inequality,
inconsistency, or unpredictability. Thus, in the context of nonstandardized
insurance terms negotiated and mutually drafted by parties with equal bar-
gaining power, the insured's sophistication may be useful to determine
what the parties meant by their choice of words. Where the court's task is
to understand the meaning of particular conduct, understanding who the
parties are may be useful and illuminating. When sophistication is consid-
ered in this context, it does not favor one party over another, but merely
protects the parties' objective intent.
II. INTERPRETING INSURANCE CONTRACTS
A. Rules of Contract Construction in the Insurance Context
The canons of insurance contract interpretation have roots in contract
law, but are not precisely the same. 2 Professor Jerry notes, "Although the
notion that an insurance contract should be interpreted by reference to
the principles that govern the interpretation of any contract is alive and
well, it is also clear that many decisions cannot be explained cogently by
reference to ordinary principles of contract interpretation."13 Professor
Fischer further explains:
The special rules governing insurance contract interpretation build on general
rules applicable to all contracts.... The rules of insurance contract interpre-
tation are, however, more than simple extensions of the basic rules of contract.
The insurance rules often have a significant twist that distinguishes them from
the general rules of contract interpretation.' 4
12. See generally Fischer, supra note 1.
13. ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING IN SURANCE LAW § 25A[c], at 176 (3d ed. 2002).
14. Fischer, supra note 1, at 1002-04. Professor Fischer gives the following examples of
"special" rules:
For example, to the general rule that the contract should be construed as a whole and the
court should attempt to give meaning and effect to all words and phrases of the contract,
we add the insurance rule that "where two interpretations equally fair may be made, that
which affords the greatest measure of protection to the insured will prevail." Similarly,
where the general rule provides that the contract should not be construed in the abstract
and parts of the contract should not be considered in isolation from the remainder of the
contract, the insurance rule provides that a specific provision, such as an endorsement, will
control over a general provision. Although the rule facially parallels a similar basic contract
rule that specific provisions govern general provisions, in insurance law the rule is a one-
way ratchet. Specific terms that expand coverage control over general terms, but specific
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Interpretation rules, as they apply to insurance cases, are more protective
of insureds generally."5 Applying canons of construction to favor the in-
sured is justified on a number of grounds, including, among others, the
parties' unequal bargaining power, the insurer's relationship of trust to the
insured, the standardized and adhesionary nature of the insurance policy,
the complexity of the contract, public policy considerations including the
desirability of favoring coverage, and the imbalance in information between
the parties.
6
There are instances where these liberal canons of construction are inapt.
For example, the rationale behind favoring the insured's interpretation of
the insurance policy is less compelling when construing legislatively man-
dated provisions, as courts and commentators generally recognize. 7 More-
over, in disputes between cedents and reinsurers, some jurisdictions assume
that they enjoy equality of information and therefore do not need protec-
tive rules.' 8
Two enduring rules of insurance contract interpretation are contra pro-
ferentem and its more modern and less predictable offspring, the reason-
able expectations doctrine.' 9 Contra proferentem requires courts to inter-
pret ambiguous contract terms against the drafter.20 In contract law, it is
typically invoked as a tiebreaker when resort to extrinsic evidence and other
canons of construction fails to yield an answer.2' Contra proferentem "is
terms that restrict coverage do not controi over general terms that provide for expanded
coverage.
Id. at 1003 (footnotes omitted).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. In Terra Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. of Am., 981 F. Supp. 581, 590-92 (N.D.
Iowa 1997), the court rejected contra proferentem in interpreting a mandated proof of loss
provision in a property insurance contract, noting "one might say that in such circumstances,
the policy is one of 'adhesion' as to both the insurer and the insured." Id. at 591 (emphasis in
original). In fact, the court attempts to discern legislative, rather than the party's, intent when
interpreting legislatively mandated provisions. Id. at 591 nn.4-5 (collecting cases). See also
LEE R. Russ, 2 CoucH ON INSURANCE § 22.22 n. 11, 11.1 (2003); JEFFREY STEMPEL, LAW OF
INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.08[e], at 4-82-83 (noting split of authority).
18. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., No. Civ.A. 00-12267-
DPW, 2003 WL 1786863, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2003). However, "[t]he applicability of
the contra proferentem doctrine to reinsurance contracts is subject to debate among U.S.
courts." Vincent J. Vitkowsky, et al., International Insurance and Reinsurance Developments, 34
INT'L L. 473, 481 (2000) (comparing Zenith Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 141 E3d
300, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1998) (contra proferentem is applicable under Wisconsin law) with
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 E3d 1049, 1065 (2d Cir. 1993) (contra profer-
entem is not applicable under New York law)).
19. See generally Fischer, supra note 1; Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insur-
ance Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543 (1996).
20. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 7.11, at 287-88.
21. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, No. 96 CIV. 7113(MGC),
2001 WL 1111514, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 21, 2001) (noting that "each party has submitted
extrinsic evidence to support its interpretation of the Insurance Contract, creating an issue
of fact that precludes application of contra proferentem at the summary judgment stage").
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not applicable if the language is unambiguous and it is often denigrated as
a rule of 'last resort."'22 However, often in insurance law contra profer-
entem is not employed merely as a tiebreaker, but also as a rule of sub-
stantive insurance law. 23
The reasonable expectations doctrine is also rooted in contract law. In
its most benign form, courts simply attempt to find the parties' intent and
to give effect to their mutually held objectively reasonable expectations,
and afford no systematic advantage to either party.24 In a more powerful
form, with regard to standardized contracts, it is used unilaterally, to favor
a consumer's reasonable expectations of standardized agreements.2 5 How-
ever, in the insurance contract, a "super form" of reasonable expectations,
as articulated by Professor Robert E. Keeton in 1970, has developed in
some jurisdictions. 26 The adoption of this super form has hardly been uni-
22. FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 7.11, at 290 (citing cases employing contra proferentem
as a tiebreaker after consideration of extrinsic evidence and after other aids to construction).
23. Professor Stempel explains that the liberalization of the admissibility of extrinsic evi-
dence has lessened the importance of contra proferentem in contract law generally. He views
employing it as a "tie breaker" in insurance disputes after extrinsic evidence is considered the
"better approach." However, he also notes that courts look to extrinsic evidence less fre-
quently in insurance cases and thus contra proferentem "retain[s] central importance" in
insurance disputes. He complains that courts sometimes turn first to contra proferentem
without considering elucidating extrinsic evidence. STEMPEL, supra note 17, § 4.11(b), at 4-
181-82.
24. See, e.g., Standard Magnesium Corp. v. United States, 241 F.2d 677 (10th Cit. 1957)
(interpreting estimates in contract according to reasonable expectations of the parties); Eskin
v. Acheson Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 1956) (interpreting agency agreement, under
Pennsylvania or New Jersey law, according to the reasonable expectations of the parties);
Huger v. Dampskisaktieselskbet Int'l, 170 E Supp. 601, 610 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (interpreting
stevedoring contract in accord with reasonable expectations); Mitchell v. Adams, 129 E Supp.
377, 388 (M.D. Ga. 1955) (employment contract interpreted in view of reasonable expecta-
tions of employer and employees); Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)
(implied in fact contract between author and television producer contains promise to fulfill
the reasonable expectations of the author); Producers Pipe & Supply Co. v. James, 332 P.2d
958, 961 (Okla. 1958) (interpreting provision in lease according to the reasonable expectations
of lessor); Tuttle v. WT Grant Co., 171 N.YS.2d 954, (N.Y. Super. 1958 ) (allowing evidence
of the parties' reasonable expectations of lease provisions), rev'd, 159 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y. 1959);
Bakenhus v. Seattle, 296 P.2d 536 (Wash. 1956) (en banc) (interpreting employment contract's
pension plan according to reasonable expectations of the employee).
25. The roots of the insurance form of reasonable expectations are contained in Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 211 (1981). It provides that parties to standardize agreements accept
the terms of a standardized agreement, except "[wihere the other party has reason to believe
that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained
a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 211 (3). In commentary, it explains, "Although customers typically adhere to stan-
dardized agreements and are bound to them without even appearing to know the standard
terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reason-
able expectation." Id. § 211 cmt. f,
26. The reasonable expectations doctrine, as it is known today, derived from two seminal
articles by Professor Keeton. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions, 83 ILAiv. L. REv. 961 (1970); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions: Part Two, 83 I-LARv. L. REv.. 1281 (1970). Numerous scholars discuss the
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versal or uniform.27 In its "strong" or broadest form, the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine allows courts to honor the reasonable expectations of
insureds even when those expectations are at variance with the policy lan-
guage.25 In its weaker form, some courts invoke it merely as an aid to
resolve ambiguities or when the contract is unconscionable or contains
hidden, technical, or obscure provisions or when waiver, estoppel, misrep-
resentation, or other public policy considerations are apparent.2 9
While insurers may perceive contra proferentem and the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine as a display of judicial bias, insureds view these doc-
trines as merely leveling an unequal playing field. Indisputably, they are
powerful litigation tools that favor insureds. Thus, it is hardly a surprise
that insurers should advance arguments such as the sophisticated insured
exception to avoid these rules in litigation. How many insureds will fit
within the exception is therefore a fertile legal question.
B. The Sophisticated Insured Exception to Contra-Insurer Canons
of Construction
In the past few decades, insurers have, with mixed success, mounted an
attack on wholesale application of these contra-insurer doctrines, at least
in some cases. Insurers argue that when insureds are sophisticated, appli-
cation of contra proferentem is not justified because there is no inequality
between the parties to justify invoking these insured-protective doctrines.
However, a precise definition of "sophisticated" is elusive. In one early and
influential case, a court refused to invoke contra proferentem, explaining:
development of the doctrine, and the varied approaches that courts have taken to it. See
generally JERRY, supra note 13, § 25D[b], at 184; Symposium, The Insurance Law Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations After Three Decades, 5 CoNN. INs. L.J. 1 (1998); Robert H. Jerry II,
Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CoNN. INS. LJ. 21 (1998).
27. Ostrager and Newman tally six states that have rejected the reasonable expectations
doctrine and forty-two that have recognized some variation of it. See 1 BARRY R. OSTRAGER
& THOMAS R. NEWMAN, INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES, § 1.03 [b], at 20-32 (1 1th ed. 2002).
The variations in the doctrine have been noted and thoroughly discussed by many scholars.
See, e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INs. LJ. 729 (2000) (exploring judicial responses and pro-
posing a middle-ground approach); Jeffrey W Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction
of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN.
INS. LJ. 181, 191 (1998) (describing judicial approaches and noting both liberal and narrow
approaches among the majority of states that have purported to have adopted the doctrine).
Professor Henderson identified a variety of forms and conducted a careful inventory of state
approaches in 1990. See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in In-
surance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 823 (1990).
28. See generally Swisher, supra note 19. See, e.g., Priority Finishing Corp. v. Hartford Steam
Boiler Inspection and Ins. Co., No. CV 940544055S, 1998 VL 731081 (Conn. Super. Oct.
6, 1998) (commenting that the reasonable expectations doctrine considers the expectations
of the "objectively reasonable insured" ... "irrespective of whether the contract language
itself is ambiguous").
29. Swisher, supra note 19; JERRY, supra note 13, at § 25D[b], at 186-87; Stempel, supra
note 2, at 827-28.
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We do not feel compelled to apply, or, indeed, justified in applying the general
rule that an insurance policy is construed against the insurer in the commercial
insurance field when the insured is not an innocent but a corporation of im-
mense size, carrying insurance with annual premiums in six figures, managed
by sophisticated business men, and represented by counsel on the same pro-
fessional level as the counsel for insurers. In substance the authorship of the
policy is attributable to both parties alike. Significantly, the policy in question
is not the usual printed form but is what is known as a "manuscript" policy,
containing some standard printed clauses but confected especially for Olin. It
is true, of course, as the trial judge observed, "scriveners of insurance policies
are acutely aware of the meaning and effect of the language". We comment:
So too, are counsel for large companies carrying fleet insurance with annual
premiums in six figures. There is no purpose in following a legal platitude that
has no realistic application to a contract confected by a large corporation and
a large insurance company each advised by competent counsel and informed
experts.30
Thus, even in this early sophisticated insured case, sophistication was a
shorthand expression to identify insureds with wealth, bargaining power,
knowledge, and legal or broker representation, which enjoyed meaningful
participation in negotiations and drafting the policy.3
Commentators writing from a pro-insurer perspective favor eliminating
contra-insurer rules broadly and applying neutral contract construction
rules to commercial insureds, in recognition that they have the bargaining
power and ability to actively participate in the insurance contracting
process:
[T]he general rule requiring construction of an insurance policy against the
insurer should have no application in the context of business insurance policies
that have been negotiated by parties with substantially equal bargaining
power.... [T]he contra-insurer rule of construction developed as a judicial
response to the unequal bargaining power of the average personal insurance
consumer in relation to his insurer, particularly in cases involving 'standard
form' personal insurance policies drafted by the insurer and marketed to
insureds on a 'take it or leave it' basis .... [B]usiness insureds, by contrast,
have considerable sophistication and bargaining power, and.., business in-
surance policies are typically negotiated (and often drafted) on behalf of the
business by corporate risk managers, independent insurance brokers and/or
attorneys .... 32
30. Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 E2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976)
(footnote and citation omitted).
31. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W2d 831, 837 n.2 (Minn.
1975) (applying rule of strict construction against the corporate insurer because the "policy
at issue was a printed form supplied by [the insurer]" and not a product of "arm's-length
negotiations").
32. Barry R. Ostrager & David W Ichel, The Role of Bargaining Power Evidence in the
Construction of the Business Insurance Policy:An Update, 18 FORUM 577 (1983). Others also favor
liberal application of the sophisticated insured exception, when large corporations rely on
their own brokers or legal departments to procure insurance. See Patrizio, supra note 5.
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Under this broader approach, courts consider factors such as "the size
and insurance sophistication of the insured, its representation by brokers
or counsel in the placement, negotiation and drafting of the policy in ques-
tion or the degree of its involvement in the administration of the policy"
to determine when to reject contra proferentem.
On the other hand, commentators writing from the insured's perspective
respond that in procuring insurance, the concept of a sophisticated policy-
holder is fabrication." They assert, among other things, that being a large
corporate insured does not necessarily equate with sophisticated knowledge
about insurance. Furthermore, regardless of the insured's wealth or size,
most insurance contracts are nevertheless standardized and unnegotiated.
They further claim that even manuscript policies that purport to be cus-
tomized and negotiated policies are in reality nothing more than cut and
pasted versions of standard forms.3 4 Pro-insurer commentators also assert
that departing from the entrenched rules of contra proferentem and rea-
sonable expectations unfairly gives sophisticated insureds less insurance
than other insureds by singling their terms out for a different and unfa-
vorable interpretation."
In 1993, Professor Stempel surveyed cases and examined the circum-
stances that led courts to employ the so-called sophisticated insured ex-
ception to avoid contra-insurer rules of contract interpretation. 6 He noted
variations in whether and how the courts applied the developing doctrine,
commenting on its mixed reception and varied formulations.37
33. Anderson & Fournier, supra note 6, at 369. They are not alone in their objection to
the sophisticated insured exception. Heintz and Danforth also believe:
The notion that the meaning of standard-form policy language should vary depending upon
the sophistication of the policyholder is anathema to the doctrine of contra proferentem.
The purpose of the doctrine is to shift the risk of ambiguity to the drafter because the
drafter has the power to avoid ambiguity through the use of more precise language. The
relative sophistication or bargaining strength of the parties is completely unrelated to this
purpose when the critical language is developed by insurance industry organizations and is
not changed for individual policyholders. Moreover, interpretation of the standard form
CGL [comprehensive general liability] policy on a contract-by-contract basis, taking into
account extrinsic evidence of each policyholder's understanding of the language at the time
of contracting, would undermine the very reason for having standard language. Such a
contract specific approach would wreak havoc upon the insurance industry, which depends
upon uniform application of the standard language regardless of the intent of individual
policyholders and carriers.
John E. Heintz & Adrienne Danforth, Construing Standard Policy Language for the "Sophisticated
Insured," 516 PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course 311, 314-15, Handbook Series No. H4-
5209 (1994). See also Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 175 n.14 (Cal. 1966) (In Bank)
(explaining that in favoring policyholders' expectations, even sophisticated insureds have no
choice in standardized provisions) (citing Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a
Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REv., 734, 748 (1966)).
34. Anderson & Fournier, supra note 6, at 369-72.
35. STEMPEL, supra note 17, §4.11(f), at 4-203.
36. See Stempel, supra note 2.
37. Id. at 848-49.
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Professor Stempel then proposed a functional approach to its application
and offered a list of factual considerations concerning the policyholder's
status and involvement in negotiation and drafting to assist a court in de-
termining a contract's meaning. He suggested that courts consider (1) the
drafter's actual identity; (2) a broker's presence and activity; (3) an attor-
ney's presence and activity; (4) the degree of negotiation and whether the
policy was customized for the insured; (5) whether the term is ambiguous
in light of the parties and the facts; (6) the parties' oral and written conduct
during negotiation, finalization, and implementation; (7) the objectively
reasonable expectations or reasonable reliance of the insured; (8) the pres-
ence of a genuine contractual relationship; (9) the presence of extrinsic
evidence; and (10) the fundamental fairness to invoke contra proferentem
against the insurer.38 Professor Stempel argued that such a factual analysis
would shed light on the meaning of a term more than a mere examination
of the relative economic and bargaining strength of the parties.3 9
In the decade since Professor Stempel's proposal, the sophisticated in-
sured exception has matured, although it has not gained universal accep-
tance or much clarity.40 It also has been invoked as an exception to the
reasonable expectations doctrine. 4' Courts have employed many of the
38. Id. at 849-55.
39. Id. at 855.
40. For example, New York law is unclear. See Sea Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Westchester Fire Ins.
Co., 51 E3d 22 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York law and holding that contra proferentem
applies even as to disputes between sophisticated insurers); Gerling Am. Ins. Co. v. Steadfast
Ins. Co., No. 00 Civ. 7907(HB), 2001 WL 936288 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 17, 2001) (noting that
contra proferentem applies even to disputes between insurers), but cf. Morgan Stanley Group
Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 225 E3d 270 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that it is unclear under
New York law whether sophisticated insureds who negotiate the contract lose the advantage
of contra proferentem); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, No. 96 CV.
7113(MGC), 2001 WL 1111514 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2001) (noting that "[iltis unsettled under
New York law, however, whether [contra proferentem] applies when the insured is a sophis-
ticated entity that negotiated the terms of the insurance contract"). Missouri law is similarly
unclear. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 305 E3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting that several cases held that contra proferentem "was inapplicable when the insured is
a sophisticated business rather than a hapless individual" but that later cases "have continued
to invoke the doctrine in cases involving commercially sophisticated insureds").
41. The sophisticated insured exception has also arisen similarly in the context of reason-
able expectations, sometimes with a more favorable outcome for the insurer. See, e.g., Oritani
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 989 E2d 635, 642-43 (3d Cir. 1993)
("We find that the average banking institution would not reasonably expect coverage recog-
nized as unavailable by the banking ,industry. Indeed, New Jersey law proscribes us from
straining to construe insurance policies to provide insurance coverage to sophisticated and
powerful insureds who have significant bargaining power and expertise in drafting insurance
contracts."); In re Reinforced Earth, Co., 925 E Supp. 913 (D.P.R. 1996) (interpreting the
scope of coverage under overlapping coverage with consideration of the fact that the insured
was a large corporation represented by brokers); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Swiss Reins.
Am. Corp., No. Civ.A. 00-12267-DPW, 2003 WL 1786863, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2003)
(reasonable expectations doctrine does not apply in a dispute between a primary insurer and
a reinsurer where "both parties are sophisticated business enterprises familiar with the prac-
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considerations Professor Stempel identified to allow a more narrow and
principled application of the sophisticated insured exception against contra
proferentem. Notably, the corporation's size and sophistication, or legal or
broker representation alone, has generally not been sufficient to warrant
abandoning contra proferentem, especially when a standard form insur-
ance policy is in dispute, 42 although sometimes cases seem to suggest that
representation and corporate wealth are substantial factors in deciding
when to discard contra proferentem.4 1 However, in most recent cases, the
tices and forms of the reinsurance industry and are well-equipped to understand the scope of
the coverage provided"); Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805, 809-10 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("Nor are literal interpretations, which assume that words or phrases are always
used in their ordinary-language sense, regardless of context, the only plausible interpretations
of contractual language, especially when the contract is between sophisticated business enti-
ties. We should at least ask what function 'physical injury' might have been intended to
perform in a comprehensive general liability policy beyond just drawing a commonsensical,
lay person's ordinary language distinction between physical injury and physical noninjury.");
Sphinx Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1336
(M.D. Fla. 2002) ("[Tlhe Plaintiffs in this case were sophisticated insureds. They were quite
able to read the insurance contract and see the exclusionary language.").
42. See, e.g., Stone Container Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 165
F3d 1157, 1160 (7th Cir. 1999) ("the principle of 'contra proferentem' . .. which Illinois
applies even where ... the insured is a large and sophisticated firm, provided it didn't actually
negotiate over the terms of coverage"); Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co.,
124 E3d 508 (3d Cir. 1997) ("the dispositive question is not merely whether the insured is a
sophisticated corporate entity, but rather whether the insurance contract is negotiated, jointly
drafted or drafted by the insured"); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co.,
933 E2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding under Delaware law that the sophisticated insured
exception is inapplicable where the insured did not participate in drafting or negotiation of
standard insurance contract terms); Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 E Supp. 2d 376,
390 (D. Del. 2002) ("While there certainly may be instances where applying the contra-
insurer rule would be inappropriate, this is not such an instance. It is clear from the docu-
mentary record before the court that CTFG had no substantial role in drafting the National
Union policy form, on which the four exclusions relied upon by National Union were standard
boilerplate terms."); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. MetPath, Inc., 38 E Supp. 2d 1087,
1092 (D. Minn. 1999) (noting that under New Jersey law, the sophisticated insured exception
is only applicable where the "insurance contract is negotiated, jointly drafted or drafted by
the insured" and that Minnesota law is unsettled if the exception is viable)! Employers Reins.
Corp. v. Worthington Custom Plastics, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 734, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
(commenting that "plaintiff fails to cite any Ohio case which suggests that ambiguities con-
tained in policy language should not be construed in favor of the insured when the insured
is either a large corporation or a self-insured employer under the workers' compensation
law"); Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1156
(D.N.J. 1993) (applying contra proferentem: "[t]his court ... is convinced that the size or
sophistication of the insured is irrelevant to the application of contra proferentem when the
policy in dispute has been drafted solely by the carrier"); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
burgh, Pa. v. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems., C.A. No. 87C-SE-1 1, 1992 WL 22690, at *9
(Del. Super. Jan. 16, 1992) (applying contra proferentem in interpreting CGL policy:
"[a]pplication of [contra proferentem] turns not on the size or sophistication of the insured,
but rather on the fact that the policy language at issue is drafted by the insurer and is not
negotiated").
43. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co., 305 E3d at 600 (commenting on Missouri law that
construing contracts against the drafter is "inapplicable when the insured is a sophisticated
business rather than a hapless individual"); Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
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primary factor that leads to rejecting contra-insurer construction rules is
the drafting history of the contract language." For some courts, the precise
language in dispute must be actually negotiated-it is not enough that
negotiation occurred generally about other provisions.4 As one court com-
540 F.2d 1257, 1262 (5th Cir. 1976); Koch Eng'g Co. v. Gibraltar Cas. Co., Inc., 878 E Supp.
1286, 1288 (E.D. Mo. 1995), aft'd, 78 E3d 1291 (8th Cir. 1996); First State Underwriters
Agency of New England Reins. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 803 E2d 1308 (NJ. 1986).
44. A number of cases reject contra proferentem based substantially upon drafting and
negotiating history. See, e.g., Newport Assocs. Dev. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Illinois,
162 E3d 789, 794 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that where the policy was drafted by an independent
broker hired by the insured, contra proferentem does not apply); Pittston Co., 124 F.3d at 521
(rejecting application of contra proferentem where "broker prepared initial draft of the pol-
icies and negotiated the terms with the insurers"); Northbrook Excess and Surplus Ins. Co.
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting application of contra
proferentem and noting that "[tihere was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that
the final Commercial policy was profoundly more that a standard insurance policy; indeed,
significant portions of the policy's language [were] customized"); Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 2001
WL 1111514, at *5 (noting that New York law is unclear and relying instead on extrinsic
evidence, but commenting that the "considerations underlying the contra proferentem rule
are absent" where insured's "experienced insurance broker ... negotiated the premium for-
mula" in dispute); Koch Eng'g Co., 878 F Supp. at 1288 (contra proferentem does not apply
where insured negotiated a "complex, twenty million dollar.., manuscript policy").
Other cases recognize the doctrine but nevertheless apply or approve application of contra
proferentem based upon lack of participation in drafting language despite sophistication. See,
e.g., Morgan Stanley Group Inc., 225 F.3d at 279-80 (noting that it is unclear if New York
recognizes a sophisticated insured exception where policy was standard form, but the insurer's
agent testified that the insurer "didn't amend for anybody"); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 7 E3d 1047, 1053 n.8 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting under Massachusetts
law that the sophisticated insured exception has been invoked sparingly, and finding no evi-
dence that the insured "participated in drafting the language at issue"); New Castle County,
933 E2d at 1189 (under Delaware law contra proferentem applies even when "the insured is
itself a corporate giant": "The critical factor remains that the ambiguity was caused by lan-
guage selected by the insurer."); Alstrin, 179 F Supp. 2d at 390 (insured "had no substantial
role in drafting" the policy form); In re Molten Metal Tech., Inc., 271 B.R. 711 (D. Mass.
2002) (contra proferentem applies where, although some terms were negotiated, the term in
question was not); CIGNA Ins. Co. v. Didimoi Prop. Holdings, NV., 110 E Supp. 2d 259
(D. Del. 2000) (holding that language is not ambiguous); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 38
E Supp. 2d at 1092 (contra proferentem applicable where there is no evidence that insured
"negotiated or jointly drafted" the policy).
45. For example, in In re Molten Metal Tech., Inc., 271 B.R. at 711, the court explained that
under Massachusetts law, "Insurers must show not only that the party procuring the insurance
coverage ... was a sophisticated commercial entity and equal in bargaining power to the
Insurers, but also that the specific language at issue was a result of bargaining between the
Insurer and [the Insured]." Id. at 724. The court acknowledged that some modification of
the disputed endorsement exclusion was negotiated, but "the crucial policy language" was not
discussed or negotiated. Id. In AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990) (In
Bank), although recognizing the concept, the California Supreme Court did not apply the
sophisticated insured exception where the parties did not negotiate the policy, even though
the policyholder's subsidiary insurance company, had itself drafted similar language:
FMC unquestionably possesses both legal sophistication and substantial bargaining power.
For this reason, the insurers contend, we should neither construe the policy language at
issue in this case in the broad sense understood by laypersons (as opposed to a narrower
technical sense) nor resolve ambiguities in favor of coverage. There is some force to these
arguments, particularly in light of the fact that FMC itself operates a subsidiary that drafts
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mented, "While it is frequently the case that insureds who draft or select
policy language are large, sophisticated corporate insureds, the wealth and
size of the insured is not relevant. Rather, the crucial inquiry in applying
the doctrine of contra proferentem is who drafted or selected the policy
language."'-
Although insurers often point to the use of a broker as a reason to reject
contra proferentem, it does not of itself compel application of the sophis-
ticated insured exception. Even experienced independent brokers may not
understand the nature of complex or novel insurance products and may
rely on the insurance company's expertise.47 On the other hand, brokers
may be liable for their negligence in procuring inadequate or inappropriate
insurance as well as in failing to advise clients of their obligations under a
policy.4 Arguably, the ability to blame an intermediary might justify a more
neutral approach to policy interpretation where the insured's agent plays
an active role in procuring particular coverage.
49
CGL policies identical to those at issue in this case. In the absence of evidence that the
parties, at the time they entered into the policies, intended the provisions at issue here to
carry technical meanings and implemented this intention by specially crafting policy lan-
guage, however, we see little reason to depart from ordinary principles of interpretation.
AIU Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1266. See also Shell Oil Co. v. Winterhur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 815, 829-20 (Ct. App. 1993).
46. AIU, Ins. Co., 799 P.2d at 1264 (rejecting the insured's interpretation of a policy pro-
vision concerning the authority of appraisers to determine the amount of loss).
47. For example, in Priority Finishing Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance
Co., No. CV 940544055S, 1998 WL 731081 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 1998), the insured,
Priority, sought to replace an all-risk commercial insurance policy. In particular, primary
coverage for its customer's goods was a key objective. Priority hired an independent broker
authorized to sell Hartford products and indicated that it desired to replace its existing policy
with one with similar coverage. At the time, Hartford was marketing a new insurance product,
which its own salesman represented to Priority's broker would cover customer goods. When
smoke damaged the customer's stored goods, Hartford refused coverage and claimed that as
to customer goods, Hartford's policy was an excess policy and not a primary policy. Inter-
preting the policy terms under Connecticut's reasonable expectations doctrine, the court
considered the "objectively reasonable expectations" "of a policyholder having an ordinary
degree of familiarity with the type of coverage involved." Id. at *10 and *11. The reasonable
expectations doctrine also requires examination of the "methods and practice of marketing"
and the insurer's representations. Even though the insureds used an experienced broker to
procure the insurance, the court noted that Hartford "was pressing its salesmen to sell" the
new product, and that its own salesmen admitted being ignorant and sold the policy "'without
knowing whether the coverage provided by the Unitech policy for the goods of others was
primary or excess in nature."' Id. at *14.
48. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Willis Corroon Corp. of Maryland, 802 A.2d 1050
(Md. 2002) (reversing summary judgment and explaining that a broker employed to obtain a
policy covering certain risks may be liable in tort or contract for failing to obtain such coverage
and failing to explain that the policy does not cover the risks sought to be covered); Baseball
Office of Comin'r v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 742 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 2002).
49. In this regard, the World Trade Center (WTC) dispute is instructive. When the WTC
collapsed on September 11, 2001, no insurance policy had actually been issued to the new
WTC lessees, the Silverstein Properties. However, numerous insurers had issued binders
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Two recent Third Circuit cases illustrate a judicious, factual approach
like that suggested by Professor Stempel. In Pittston Co. UltramarAmerica
Ltd. v. Allianz Insurance Co.,50 the court considered whether, under New
Jersey law, a policyholder's Comprehensive Marine Liability Packages af-
forded coverage for environmental liability of an additional insured to a
named insured.52 Beginning in 1954, Pittston operated an oil storage and
transfer facility called Tankport. The property had been used as an oil
refinery in the 1930s as well. In Pittston's operation, oil arrived by barge
to a pier, and was then pumped from the barge through pipelines and stored
in storage tanks on the land until transferred to trucks for land delivery to
customers. The tanks on land were at or below the water table and leaks
and spills over the years had caused extensive pollution issues. Pittston sold
Tankport to Ultramar and agreed to indemnify Ultramar for contamination
occurring during Pittston's ownership. Pittston had comprehensive general
liability53 policies in place. However, beginning in 1971, the CGL policies
began excluding pollution coverage. In 1978, Pittston also purchased a
series of CMLPs as well as CGL policies. Both Pittston and Ultramar
tendered pollution cleanup cost claims to various insurers, and the litiga-
tion involved multiple issues, including the scope of coverage under the
CGL policies and whether the known loss and loss in progress doctrines
excluded coverage.1
4
covering the property. After the terrorist attack, the issue arose whether the collapse of the
towers constituted one or two occurrences under the per occurrence coverage provision. The
binder correspondence reflected agreement on the WilProp form, which contained the fol-
lowing definition of occurrence:
"Occurrence" shall mean all losses or damages that are attributable directly or indirectly
to one cause or to one series of similar causes. All such losses will be added together and
the total amount of such losses will be treated as one occurrence irrespective of the period
of time or area over which such losses occur.
SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC, 345 E3d 154, 160 (2d Cir.
2003). The WilProp form, with this restrictive definition of occurrence, was a "manuscript
form" created by Willis of New York, Silverstein's own independent broker. Id. at 173. Ironi-
cally, Travelers Insurance was to be the lead underwriter, and a Travelers policy would most
likely have become the form of the policy eventually issued. The Travelers policy did not
contain a definition of occurrence at all. See id. at 180. Thus, Silverstein's own broker offered
a provision less favorable and more restrictive in scope than the insurers would have and
Silverstein found itself fighting its broker's own form. The court affirmed the lower court
and held that the WilProp form was unambiguous and that the attacks on the twin towers
were "one series of similar causes" and thus a single occurrence. Id. It also ruled that the
Travelers form, to which Travelers bound itself, was ambiguous because it lacked a definition
of occurrence. Id. at 182. In interpreting the WilProp form, the court did not invoke contra
proferentem against either party. It relied on the plain meaning rule. Id. at 180.
50. 124 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1997).
51. Hereinafter CMLP.
52. Pittston, 124 E3d at 519.
53. Hereinafter CGL.
54. Pittston, 124 E3d at 515.
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Whether the CMLP covered land-based pollution raised the sophisti-
cated insured exception issue. Pittston's marine policy in question was di-
vided into a general terms and conditions section and a section that pro-
vided specific insuring agreements. The specific insuring agreements
provided insurance for marine risks rather than for land-based operations.
Pittston argued that a broad provision within the General Policy Terms
and Conditions and Insuring Agreements granted freestanding coverage
for the pollution claim regardless of the limited scope of the specific
insuring agreements within another part of the policy."5 The insured ar-
gued that a general provision providing coverage for "any loss, damage
liability and/or expense arising out of, or in consequence of... discharge,
emissions, spillage, or leakage upon or into the seas, waters, land or air, of
oil petroleum products, chemicals or other substances of any kind or nature
whatsoever" covered its liability for the contamination from the Tankport
storage tanks.
The insurer, on the other hand, argued that the general provisions por-
tion of the policy did not create insurance and that under the architecture
of the policy, coverage existed only as to the named insuring agreements.
Those insuring agreements covered traditional marine risks-charterer's
liability, wharfinger's liability, cargo liability, and owned barges liability.
Thus, the insurer argued, there was no insurance agreement for pollution
caused by oil storage tanks on the land. The trial court concluded that
there was no ambiguity and that the architecture of the policy form made
clear that there was no land-based coverage.16 The appellate court reversed
on this issue, remanding for a determination as to whether the general
terms and conditions section afforded stand-alone coverage for all types of
pollution, including that occurring on the land."
Neither the trial nor the appellate court gave Pittston the advantage of
contra proferentem.5 s Pittston had a high level of sophistication, represen-
tation by brokers, and substantial participation in crafting the policy. The
evidence suggested that Pittston might have appreciated that the policy
was ambiguous and that the insurer might not have intended to cover land
pollution, but Pittston took its chances because it was unable to secure land
pollution coverage elsewhere anyway.5 9 Moreover, there was conflicting
55. Id. at 519-20.
56. Id. at 514-15.
57. Id. at 523.
58. SeePittston Co. UltramarAm. Ltd. v. AllianzIns. Co., 905 F Supp. 1279, 1320(D.Nj.
1995) and Pittston, 124 F.3d at 520.
59. Pittston, 905 F Supp. at 1323. For example, a contemporaneous memo by Pittston
stated its understanding that the CMLP provided broad coverage, but cautioned to keep this
fact confidential, noting, "As we were trying to put this program together, several large bro-
kerage houses indicated such pollution coverage was simply unavailable and that higher limits
for the rest of the marine program were obtainable but only at exorbitantly high prices." Id.
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expert testimony regarding how the two-part policy structure should func-
tion together in a marine package policy.60 That structure allowed Pittston
to add new types of coverage in part two, while retaining the general terms
in part one.61 There also was evidence of direct negotiations regarding
known land pollution risks beyond the marine risks and the insurer's rep-
resentations that coverage was refused. 62
The appellate court agreed with the insured that the scope of coverage
under the policy terms was ambiguous. Still, though, the court did not
resolve the case merely by invoking contra proferentem. 63 Instead, the
court remanded for trial as to the policy's meaning.64 It acknowledged that
New Jersey law requires any ambiguities in an insurance contract to be
resolved in favor of the insured.6 However, the court explained, the ratio-
nale behind contra proferentem is premised on the adhesive nature of in-
surance, and contra proferentem is inapplicable when the contract is truly
negotiated:
Read in conjunction, these cases indicate that the dispositive question is not
merely whether the insured is a sophisticated corporate entity, but rather
whether the insurance contract is negotiated, jointly drafted or drafted by the
insured. In such instances, we conclude that the doctrine of contra proferentum
should not be invoked to inure to the benefit of the insured.66
The court then examined the drafting history and the broker's role
during contract negotiations and concluded that contra proferentem was
inapplicable:
Here, it is undisputed that Pittston hired an insurance broker, Sedgewick
James of New York, to secure marine insurance. The broker testified in his
deposition that he prepared the initial draft of the policies and negotiated the
terms with the insurers.... As such, we conclude that the CMLP policies were
not contracts of adhesion and are more properly treated as traditional, jointly-
negotiated contracts.... Thus, Pittston, as a sophisticated insured who was
heavily involved in the drafting and negotiating of the policies, cannot benefit
from the general rule favoring coverage, and we will not apply it here.67
The court commented on the memo's significance: "While this evidence may show Pittston's
belief as to what coverage it had bought, or hoped to buy, it undercuts the claim that it had
an actual meeting of the minds on the issue with its insurer and that any supposed misun-
derstanding on its part was reasonable." Id.
60. Id. at 1326.
61. Id. at 1321.
62. Id. at 1323-24.
63. Pittston, 124 F.3d at 520-21.
64. Id. at 523 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 520.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus, the factors that the court considered in discarding contra profer-
entem included (1) that the insured was a sophisticated entity; (2) that the
contract was jointly negotiated; (3) that an independent broker represented
the insured; and (4) that the insured's broker had a significant role in draft-
ing the policy by contributing the initial policy draft.
Similarly, Newport Associates Development Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of
Illinois 68 is a case where factual inquiry into the negotiating process also
justified application of the sophisticated insured exception. The insured
hired an independent broker, Feinstein, to procure insurance for its marina
operation. Feinstein took photographs of the marina and met with the
insured's employees to discuss the scope of insurance desired.69 Feinstein
drafted scope of coverage language, which insured, among other things,
"[s]lips, consisting of metal slips, walkways, ramps, pilings, power cables
and other integral parts."10 Feinstein testified that he intended to cover
"everything in the water." Feinstein placed the insurance with Travelers,
which incorporated the language verbatim in the policy it issued. When a
breakwater about 120 feet from the pier was damaged, the insured sought
coverage for the loss under the policy. Travelers denied the claim, asserting
that the breakwater was not covered. The court refused to apply contra
proferentem, examining Feinstein's role in depth:
Here, the insurance policy was drafted by an independent broker who was
hired by Newport and acted in consultation with Newport employees. The
drafted policy was then shopped to at least two different insurance companies.
Newport selected Travelers after reviewing its proposed policy, and Travelers
adopted the broker's policy language without any changes to the provisions at
issue. Under these circumstances, we believe the contract was either drafted
by Newport or jointly drafted, and the doctrine of contra proferentem does
not operate in Newport's favor.7'
After considering the extrinsic evidence, the court held that the language
in dispute was not ambiguous.
On the other hand, a third case illustrates a troublesome application of
the sophisticated insured exception with relatively less factual inquiry and
where the disputed language derived from standard policies. In Koch En-
gineering Co. v. Gibraltar Casualty Co.,72 the insured, a manufacturer of a
filtration system using innovative packing material, claimed that its liability
policy covered damages sustained by Monsanto, its customer, following the
68. 162 E3d 789 (3d Cir. 1998).
69. Id. at 794.
70. Id. at 791.
71. Id. at 794-95.
72. 878 E Supp. 1286 (E.D. Mo. 1995), afJfd, 78 E3d 1291 (8th Cir. 1996).
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failure of Koch's product to perform as promised. Koch alleged that its
liability to Monsanto constituted an occurrence under the policy, while the
insurer claimed that a breach of contract was not an occurrence and that,
additionally, coverage for the insured's product and work were exceptions
to coverage under the policy. The policy in question defined an occurrence
as "an accident, a happening, an event, or a continuous or repeated expo-
sure to conditions which results ... in Property Damage....""
In interpreting the policy terms the lower court refused to apply contra
proferentem. However, it gave no detail about the drafting or negotiation
process:
As a preface to the discussion, the Court finds that the doctrine of contra
proferentem, which construes the policy against the insurance company as the
drafter of the contract, does not apply. In addition to the lack of ambiguity in
the policy which would preclude the application of the doctrine, it does not
apply to sophisticated contractors. In analyzing a dispute involving Missouri
law, Judge Wisdom warned against the automatic adoption of the contra pro-
ferentem doctrine:
We do not feel compelled to apply, or, indeed, justified in applying the
general rule... in the commercial insurance field when the insured is not
an innocent but a corporation of immense size, carrying insurance with
annual premiums in six figures, managed by sophisticated business men
and represented by counsel on the same professional level as the counsel
for insurers.
That analysis applies to the situation in this case. Koch negotiated a complex,
twenty million dollar policy with the Defendants. In fact, in this case, the
parties negotiated what they called a manuscript policy, the mere tide of which
indicates that it was not an adhesion, preprinted contract but a policy nego-
tiated by two equal parties on a level playing field; therefore, Koch is not
entitled to any special protection.14
Thereafter, the court determined that there was no ambiguity, in essence
making its prefatory rejection of contra proferentem mere dicta. The court
simply looked to Missouri law to explain the meaning of an occurrence
and relied on its conventional meaning, concluding that it did not encom-
pass breach of contract claims.7" The court further decided that even if the
damage constituted an occurrence, coverage "would still be denied because
the damages fall under the insured's work and insured's product exceptions
within the policy. '7 6 The court may have correctly decided that the policy
73. Koch Eng'g, 78 E3d at 1293.
74. Koch Eng'g, 878 E Supp. at 1288 (quoting Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976)). The appellate court affirmed. It did not make any
reference to the sophisticated insured exception, but neither did it apply contra proferentem.
Koch Eng'g, 78 F.3d at 1296.
75. Koch Eng'g, 878 E Supp. at 1288-89.
76. Id. at 1289.
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was not ambiguous, especially because Missouri law does not include
breach of contract within its common definition of occurrence in CGL
policies. However, the court's gratuitous rejection of the contra-insurer
rules to interpret these standard terms based solely on the insured's rep-
resentation during negotiations and the policy being a negotiated manu-
script policy, without a more detailed inquiry, is unsettling. The case does
not discuss any evidence that the terms "occurrence" or the "insured's
product" were in fact negotiated, or were even negotiable, whether they
were to have anything but a standard definition, who offered the terms, or
who drafted the policy. "Occurrence" and "insured's product" are certainly
common words in standardized policies and therefore probably came to be
in the contract because of the standardized meaning that the parties as-
cribed to the words. That standardized language carried with it the expec-
tation that it would be interpreted against insurers. Simply characterizing
the policy as a so-called manuscript policy is an unconvincing justification.
As many have noted, the characterization may merely mean that the insurer
created a customized policy from a menu of standard terms drafted by it,
rather than actually negotiated terms. Therefore, this label alone is uncon-
vincing reason to abandon contra proferentem. 77
C. A Principled and Narrow Approach
As courts now recognize, the sophisticated insured exception to contra
proferentem should have limited vitality.7" Decisions increasingly examine
the factors Professor Stempel outlined, including the drafting history, the
equality of bargaining power, the representation, and the access to infor-
mation of the parties. Courts also should allow the exception only when
the disputed language, regardless of the insured's active participation in
negotiations or sophistication, is not standardized language.
The sophisticated insured exception should not be applied when inter-
preting standardized agreements or standard provisions.79 The fairness of
applying contra proferentem whenever the language in question is stan-
dardized is apparent. By standardizing, insurers gain certain clear advan-
tages including efficiency, predictability, and control over drafting. 0 More-
over, standardization allows insurers to rate and calculate their losses based
77. See Anderson & Fournier, supra note 6, at 369-72.
78. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., Ltd., 7 F.3d 1047, 1053
(lst Cir. 1993) (under Massachusetts law, sophisticated insured exception is invoked "spar-
ingly").
79. See, e.g., Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690,
697 (Ct. App. 1996) ("A policy should not be read as it might be analyzed by an attorney or
an insurance expert. This is so even if the policyholder is a sophisticated insured.") (citations
omitted).
80. See Swisher, supra note 27, at 759 (discussing the advantages of standardized insurance
contracts).
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on experience with the same provisions; it allows the insurer to expect
"more consistent or predictable judicial decisionmaking ... thereby 're-
ducing coverage litigation,' " it "reduces public confusion," and it "facili-
tate[s] claims handling because claims disposition is made more uniform
at less cost."'8' Regardless of which party offers the standardized language,
it was initially drafted by the insurance industry with the assumption that
it would be interpreted against the insurer. If the insurer does not desire
the words to mean exactly what the words mean in other cases litigating
those same standardized terms, it should say that here the words are unique
and are not meant to carry a standardized meaning. Otherwise, it would
be unfair to allow the insurer to capitalize on its customer's sophistication
and to claim an advantage that it never sought when it adopted the standard
language. Rejecting contra proferentem with regard to sophisticated in-
sureds means that the sophisticated insured obtains a different and inferior
policy to layperson insureds when, by accepting standardized language,
such was not the expectation of either party.
The decision not to individualize the interpretation of standardized
agreements or standardized clauses properly elevates these contra-insurer
interpretation rules in standardized language cases beyond mere canons of
construction and recognizes them as substantive. The contra proferentem
rule determines what the contract means, without regard to what the par-
ties might have thought or intended, and so is not merely interpretative."2
The argument against applying a sophisticated insured exception, with
regard to standardized forms, finds support in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 211, which covers how to interpret standardized agreements.
Section 211 advises courts interpreting standardized agreements to "seek
to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the average member of the
public who accepts it" even though "[t]he result may be to give the advan-
tage of a restrictive reading to some sophisticated customers who con-
81. STEMPEL, supra note 17, § 4.06[c] (citing Laurence A. Silverman & Michael J. Lane,
Rules of Construction in Insurance Policies, in INSURANCE, ExCESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE
DIsPurrEs 1989, at 19-19 (Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman eds. 1989)). See also
David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HAv.
L. REv. 529 (1971) (noting increasing use of standardized contracts and advantages and dis-
advantages); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630-32 (1943) (noting industry advantages in using standard-
ized contracts, including avoiding and controlling "juridical risks").
82. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Frpectations Reconsidered, 17 CONN. L. REV. 323, 328
(1986) (noting that when contra proferentem is elevated from a tiebreaker rule it is trans-
formed to one of substantive insurance law); Henderson, snpra note 27, at 826-28 (noting
that in its stronger form, the reasonable expectations doctrine is not a mere canon of con-
struction but one of substantive insurance law). The idea that contra proferentem is not a
mere aid in the construction of ambiguous terms, but a substantive rule of insurance law, is
not unlike the concept of the parol evidence rule, which is regarded not merely as an
evidentiary rule but as substantive contract law. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 7.2, at
213-14.
106 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Fall 2003 (39:1)
tracted with knowledge of an ambiguity or dispute."83 It acknowledges the
advantages of using standard forms, including predictability, reduced trans-
action costs, and mass marketing advantages that inure to the drafter. How-
ever, section 211 also recognizes disadvantages to the nondrafting party,
including the risk that the drafter inserts unfair provisions, the lack of
meaningful assent to specific terms, and the loss of bargaining and control
over the transactionm On balance, in the case of standardized agreements,
the Restatement favors uniformity in interpretation to achieve equality of
treatment.8
Insurers expect and desire equality of treatment from standardized lan-
guage as well. The industry depends on certainty and predictability to set
premiums and predict losses. Standardization protects against uncertainty
and allows insurers to predict future losses and to collect data to set
premiums.
Uniformity of policy language is a critical element of this loss prediction pro-
cess because it ensures that carriers will experience the same covered losses
under the same set of circumstances. If each carrier's losses were derived from
different policy language, the statistics collected by the ratings bureaus could
never serve as the basis for loss prediction and rate-setting. Similarly, if indi-
vidual carriers applied standard-form language differently, their loss experi-
ence data would be useless to the ratings bureaus.86
On the other hand, when policy language at issue is individualized and
mutually drafted by parties with equal bargaining power and knowledge,
83. The Restatement justifies equal treatment because parties expect equal treatment with
all others who enter into a standard contract:
e. Equality of treatment. One who assents to standard contract terms normally assumes that
others are doing likewise and that all who do so are on an equal footing. In the case of a
public utility, that assumption is fortified by statutory and common law limitations on
discrimination among customers; a term prescribed by statute or regulation in the case of
an insurance policy also carries an assurance of equal treatment. Apart from government
regulation, courts in construing and applying a standardized contract seek to effectuate the
reasonable expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it. The result
may be to give the advantage of~a restrictive reading to some sophisticated customers who
contracted with knowledge of an ambiguity or dispute.
Illustration:
4. A, an insurance company, issues an insurance policy to B covering injuries "by accidental
means." A clause in the policy excludes "disability or other loss resulting from or contrib-
uted to by any disease or ailment." B believes himself to be in good health, but has a latent
Parkinson's disease. Later an accidental blow activates the disease into a disabling condition.
B is covered by the policy without regard to his knowledge or understanding of the quoted
language at the time of contracting.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. e, illus. 4 (1981).
84. Id. § 211 cmts. a-c.
85. Id. §211 cmt. e.
86. Heintz & Danforth, supra note 33, at 318-19. These authors comment that "inter-
pretation of the standard form CGL policy on a contract-by-contract basis, taking into ac-
count extrinsic evidence of each policyholder's understanding of the language at the time of
contracting, would undermine the very reason for having standard language." Id. at 314.
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then contra proferentem has less appeal or justification. The factual in-
quiry, therefore, also should include consideration of whether the disputed
language is a standard provision. If the term is standard, regardless of who
offered it, contra proferentem should apply to favor the insured. However,
where the provision in dispute is not a standard provision, inequality, the
desirability of predictability, and the risks of differing decisions do not arise.
Moreover, in the case of mutually negotiated nonstandardized provisions,
the parties would not expect the interpretation to be weighted against
either one. Parties with equal bargaining power with representation and
access to information do not need contra proferentem to ameliorate over-
reaching and unfairness."7
Considering how the standardization caveat would apply in the three
cases recounted above shows how it further narrows Professor Stempel's
functional approach. Newport and Pittston both applied a careful, functional
approach. Moreover, each case raises sufficiently factual issues so as not to
pose consistency, predictability, and equality problems.
Newport offers a strong justification for abandoning contra proferentem
because the descriptive language in question (that is, does the description
"[s]lips, consisting of metal slips, walkways, ramps, pilings, power cables
and other integral parts" cover a breakwater 120 feet away?) was unique
to this dispute and was not standardized. The intended meaning was in-
dividualized between sophisticated parties. Moreover, there is no risk that
this outcome will result in unequal treatment because the language is
unique; for the same reason, there is little or no risk of inconsistency and
unpredictability.
Pittston also supports abandoning contra proferentem, especially because
the evidence suggests that the placement of the ambiguous pollution clause
was negotiable and could have been moved."' However, if the placement
87. California follows this narrow approach, which considers legal sophistication, equality
of bargaining power, and actual negotiation, but also requires joint drafting of the provision
in dispute and language that is not standardized:
The insurers have submitted evidence (specifically, an internal FMC memorandum stating
that the policies were written "on a line-per-line basis through continuing negotiation with
the insurance carrier") that FMC individually negotiated the policies in question. This
evidence does not, however, shed light on the meaning to be ascribed to the coverage
provisions at issue here. These provisions, as we have noted above, are adopted verbatim
from standard form policies used throughout the country. For this reason, even if the
policies were "negotiated" in a broad sense, this fact has little bearing on construction of
the specific policy language in question here.
AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1266 n.9 (Cal. 1990). See also Berres v. Artifex,
Ltd., 21 F. Supp. 2d 909, 913 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Shell Oil Co. v. Winterhur Swiss Ins. Co.,
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 829 (Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added).
88. Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co:, 905 F. Supp. 1279, 1324 (D.NJ.
1995) (noting that when Ultramar took over the operations, it insisted on reorganizing the
sections of the CMLP insurance).
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of the pollution provision within the general terms section was not unique,
but followed the structure of marine policies generally, the outcome in
Pittston should be consistent in how it interprets the two sections of a
marine policy. Providing a nonstandardized interpretation to a standard-
ized structure would give an advantage to the insurer in litigation that was
probably not contemplated. Therefore, assuming that either the language
or the structure of the policy was common to marine policies and not
unique to this particular insurance contract, 9 how the general provisions
and the insuring agreements fit together should comport to the standard
meaning and structure common to marine liability policies, because the
insurer and the insured likely intended that. That meaning and structure
shouldbe interpreted by means of contra proferentem, for the sake of
uniformity, predictability, and equality.
Finally, Koch Engineering is a case where the sophisticated insured excep-
tion is not appropriate because the words "occurrence" and "insured's
product" are standard terms. Notably, the court actually looked to other
Missouri cases to define "occurrence" and "insured's product" and held
that the terms were unambiguous in this instance. But by rejecting contra
proferentem, the court ran the risk that these standard terms would not
have the same meaning in cases between sophisticated insureds and insur-
ers. This raises equality, consistency, and predictability problems and would
allow the insurer to capture an unbargained-for advantage by departing
from the meaning of the terms that the parties likely ascribed by virtue of
their standardization.
III. OTHER CONTEXTS CONSIDERING THE INSURED'S
SOPHISTICATION
Professor Stempel presciently recognized that there could be other situa-
tions in which to appropriately consider the insured's sophistication, aside
from contract interpretation: "Although focusing on the ambiguity prin-
ciple, judicial acceptance of the notion that contract doctrine varies some-
what according to the nature of the parties and the facts of the transaction
should affect other contract rules in addition to contra proferentem-for
example waiver, estoppel, and reasonable expectations. '" 90
Insurance companies are increasingly inviting courts to consider the so-
phistication of insureds in other contexts to level the playing field. They
89. There is no reason to assume that the policies in question were particularly unique or
that the insureds intended the policies to expand or narrow coverage beyond the ordinary
expectations of purchasers of marine policies. Notably, in addition to the marine policies, the
insureds had CGL policies in place as well, but those excluded pollution coverage. Pittston
Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 3d 508, 514 (3d Cir. 1997).
90. Stempel, supra note 2, at 832.
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have argued that courts should consider the sophistication of the insured
in a variety of estoppel and waiver contexts, in deciding whether to apply
the notice-prejudice rule in delayed and defective notice or tender cases,
and in deciding whether to excuse an insurer's own failure to strictly com-
ply with statutory provisions. In these instances, the insured's sophistica-
tion is considered in determining the reasonableness of the insured's con-
duct or intent, or in weighing the harm of the insurer's conduct in light of
the insured's ability to protect itself.
A. Heightened Duties to Read, Understand, and Object to Policy Terms
Even sophisticated, experienced insureds represented by brokers may in-
voke the reasonable expectations doctrine in estoppel situations, 91 although
there is more doubt whether that doctrine has a clear rationale in the
context of interpreting provisions between equal parties.92
Reliance Insurance Co. v. Moessne 3 presents a careful consideration of the
insured's sophistication under the reasonable expectations doctrine in an
estoppel context. The issue was whether a CGL policy's total pollution
exclusion94 endorsement in a renewal policy was applicable to a claim based
upon the insured's liability to an injured customer overcome by carbon
monoxide from the insured's product. The insured argued that the pollu-
tion exclusion applied only to environmental catastrophes, and was not
intended to exclude bodily injury claims caused by a poisonous emission
from the insured's product. The court disagreed that the policy language
was ambiguous, stating that the TPE in the renewal policy "unambiguously
bars coverage for the claims." 9
Under the reasonable expectations doctrine, however, the court reversed
and remanded for trial even though the insured was sophisticated and the
policy was unambiguous. Under Pennsylvania law, "even the most clearly
written exclusion will not bind the insured where the insurer or its agent
has created in the insured a reasonable expectation of coverage. '96 More-
over, "[w]here an individual applies and prepays for specific coverage, the
insurer may not unilaterally change the coverage provided without an af-
91. See, e.g., Priority Finishing Corp. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co.,
No. CV940544055S, 1998 WL 731081 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 1998) (applying reasonable
expectations doctrine to favor the insured's expectations where insurer's salesmen assured
independent broker that the policy provided certain coverages).
92. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976) (In Bank) (holding that a
health plan negotiated between the State of California and Kaiser Foundation is not a contract
of adhesion and reasonable expectations doctrine was inapplicable because plan was the "prod-
uct of negotiation between two parties... possessing parity of bargaining strength").
93. 121 E3d 895 (3d Cir. 1997).
94. Hereinafter TPE.
95. Moessner, 121 F.3d at 902.
96. Id. at 903.
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firmative showing that the insured was notified of, and understood, the
change, regardless of whether the insured read the policy."97 To discern the
insured's reasonable expectations, the court examined the manner in which
the original and replacement insurance policies were procured. For ex-
ample, the renewal policy contained the unambiguous exclusion, whereas
the original policy did not. The original policy was procured after VE, the
insured, hired a brokerage firm to acquire insurance. VE specifically re-
quested that its broker acquire insurance with coverage for losses arising
from the use of its "vaporator" and informed the broker that the vaporator
emitted carbon monoxide as a by-product of normal operation. The broker
conveyed that information to the underwriter at Reliance, the insurer, and
the original policy, which would have covered the loss, was issued.9 Ac-
cording to the court, at the time of renewal, Reliance "unilaterally inserted
the TPE endorsement into VE's renewal policy and never brought that
change to VE's attention."99
The court determined that the reasonable expectations doctrine could ap-
ply, despite the lack of ambiguity, based on estoppel. 00 The court next con-
sidered whether status as a sophisticated insured represented by an experi-
enced broker precluded application of the reasonable expectations doctrine.
The court concluded that it did not. "While sophisticated insureds may ex-
97. Id. at 904.
98. Id. at 906.
99. Id. at 906. In Twelve Knotts Ltd. P'ship v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 589 A.2d 105 (Md.
1991), the court considered an insured's failure to object to policy provisions that did not
conform to the contract as orally agreed, affirming Maryland's rule that an insured has a duty
to read and understand its policy and that "[i]f the terms of the policy are inconsistent with
his desires, he is required to notify the insurer of the inconsistency and of his refusal to accept
the condition." Twelve Knotts Ltd. Psbip, 589 A.2d at 113. In explaining the reasonableness of
the rule in that case, the court reasoned that "[a]ppellant is a sophisticated business entity
having had previous experience purchasing insurance. The offending provision is clear and
unambiguous." Twelve Knotts Ltd. P'ship, 589 A.2d at 113. The court then held that by ne-
glecting to object until the end of the policy year, the insured was deemed to have accepted
the nonconforming provision. Twelve Knotts Ltd. P'sbip, 589 A.2d at 114. -
100. Moessner, 121 E3d at 903. Although the court held that the exclusion was not ambig-
uous, detrimental reliance or equitable estoppel arguably justifies the court's willingness to
invoke reasonable expectations. It relied on earlier precedent: "[W]here an individual applies
and prepays for specific insurance coverage, the insurer may not unilaterally change the cov-
erage provided without an affirmative showing that the insured was notified of, and under-
stood, the change, regardless of whether the insured read the policy." Id. at 904 (citing Ben-
salem Township v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1311 (3d Cir. 1994)). See also
TJS Brokerage & Co., Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2755 Dec. Term 1995, 2000 WL
1060645, at **20-21 n.8 (Pa. C.P. Apr. 24, 2000) (declining to reach whether sophisticated
insured is entitled to reasonable expectations doctrine, but holding that despite clear policy
language, where the insurer creates an expectation of coverage, the reasonable expectations
of an insured will be honored unless insurer makes an affirmative showing that insured was
informed and understood limitations of coverage); Cf. Swisher, supra note 19, at 603 ("based
on the acts and representations made by the insurer or its agents, the legal doctrines of waiver,
estoppel, election, and reformation of contract are also available to the insured and should be
liberally construed to validate the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage").
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ercise more bargaining power vis-A-vis the insurers, and therefore be in less
need of protection from the courts than other insureds, the rationale of the
reasonable expectations doctrine is still applicable when the insurer unilat-
erally alters the insurance coverage requested by the insured.''
The court added a proviso, however.
[Wihile we predict that Pennsylvania will not make the status of the insured
determinative of the applicability of the reasonable expectations doctrine, we
also believe that it would deem the insured's status to be a factor to be con-
sidered when resolving whether the insured acted reasonably in expecting a
given claim to be covered. °2
The court then identified factors both tending to show that the insured
did reasonably expect coverage as well as tending to suggest that it did not.
Evidence tending to negate an expectation of coverage included the bro-
ker's and the insured's general familiarity with TPE provisions as well as
their notice of the changes based on the endorsement on the renewal,
which clearly and boldly stated that it contained changes, that the policy
was reviewed and unobjected to when it was received (albeit three months
after coverage commenced), and that the premium was drastically reduced.
As to the insured's failure to object to the policy terms after the policy was
issued, the court stated, "We thus believe that Pennsylvania would hold
that the duty [of the insurer to inform the insured of changes at variance
with the coverage requested] is presumptive, but can be set aside when a
sophisticated insured is given constructive notice of a change at a time
when it can negotiate an alteration in the policy." 103
This decision represents a good example of how sophistication should
be considered. Sophisticated insureds should not lose traditional safeguards
of insurance law and the law should not indulge two sets of rules based on
the status of insureds. However, a party's sophistication should be consid-
ered to explain the intent of its conduct. Considering the insured's so-
phistication in this context is entirely appropriate because the question is
whether this insured had constructive notice of the policy provisions at a
time when the insured could still reject the terms. That question is nec-
essarily factual, and can only be answered by examining the insured's con-
duct. Here, considering the insured's status helps gives contextual meaning
to the insured's conduct. Moreover, considering the insured's sophistica-
tion in this context will not make for inconsistent decisions because notice
is necessarily a factual question.
101. Moessner, 121 F.3d at 905.
102. Id. at 906.
103. Id. at 908.
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B. Defective Tender or Notice
Generally, insureds must give notice and tender claims to insurers as con-
ditions of coverage.- ° Often compliance with the prescribed manner and
time of notice and tender is a condition of coverage.' 0 Not infrequently,
insureds fail to conform precisely to such policy provisions because of an
oversight or ignorance. Some jurisdictions continue to hold that the unex-
cused failure to abide by notice and tender provisions can result in forfei-
ture of coverage.10 6 However, to ameliorate the harshness of forfeiture, the
modern trend has been to excuse defective tender or notice unless the insurer
has been prejudiced by the delay or defect. °y Thus, some jurisdictions re-
quire the insured to show the absence of prejudice to the insurer, since prej-
udice is otherwise presumed. 08 Others require the insurer to affirmatively
show that it was prejudiced. *0 9 Still others consider prejudice as one factor
in determining if the delay or defect was excusable or reasonable."10
104. "The traditional approach is grounded upon a strict contractual interpretation of
insurance policies under which delayed notice was viewed as constituting a breach of contract,
making the issue of insurer prejudice immaterial." Clementi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 16 P.3d 223, 226, 232 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (overruling traditional approach and holding
that "once it has been established that an insured has unreasonably provided delayed notice
to an insurer, an insurer may only deny benefits if it can prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it was prejudiced by the delay").
105. See generally Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Requiring Liability
Insurer to Show Prdudice to Escape Liability Because of Insured's Failure or Delay in Giving Notice
of Accident or Claim, or in Forwarding Suit Papers, 32 A.L.R.4th 141 (1984 & Supp. 2002).
106. See id. at 146-52 (collecting cases). See also Clementi, 16 P.3d at 223 (collecting cases
and commenting that "[flew courts today strictly adhere to the traditional approach which
allowed for no consideration of insurer prejudice in determining whether benefits should be
denied due to noncompliance with an insurance policy's notice requirements").
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 229 (1981). See also Ferrando v. Auto-
Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 781 N.E.2d 927, 946 (Ohio 2002) ("Furthermore, the rule requiring
an inquiry into prejudice is the accepted rule in a significant majority of states, and this rule
also appears sound when applied in cases involving breach of a consent-to-settle or other
subrogation-related provision; a clear majority of states also require an inquiry into prejudice
in those cases. The reasons relied on by a majority of states, detailed above, to impose a
prejudice requirement in such cases are compelling."); Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845,
852-53, 856 (Tenn. 1998) ("resolving to join the modem trend" and overruling traditional
rule and establishing a rebuttable presumption rule).
108. See, e.g., U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Vanderbilt Univ., 267 E3d 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (under
Tennessee law prejudice is rebuttably presumed by failure to provide timely notice); Ferrando
v. Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 781 N.E.2d 927 (Ohio 2002); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Murphy,
538 A.2d 219 (Conn. 1988).
109. See Marvel, supra note 105, at 152-67 (collecting cases). See also Akazar, 982 S.W2d
at 854 ("A clear plurality of states hold that once it is demonstrated that the insured breached
the notice provision, the burden of proof is allocated to the insurer to prove that it has been
prejudiced by the breach.")
110. See Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Laserage Tech. Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 296,305 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(under Illinois law); Am. Country Ins. Co. v. Bruhn, 682 N.E.2d 366, 370 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997);
Koski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 572 N.W2d 636, 639 (Mich. 1998). See also Clementi, 16 P.3d at 223
("[w]e find this approach problematic because we believe that insurer prejudice is not relevant
to the reasonableness of the insured's delayed notice, and thus should not be considered as a
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Whatever the formulation of the notice-prejudice rule, insurers recently
have argued that sophisticated insureds should not be excused. One ratio-
nale insurers offer is that sophisticated insureds should be expected to act
professionally and reasonably by giving proper and timely notice and suffer
the consequences of their lapses.' As one court explained,
we do assume that a corporation... is presumed to have more sophistication
in managing its affairs than the average consumer, and thus should be able to
recognize and adhere to notice provisions in its contracts of insurance that
require it to contact its carriers "as soon as practicable" in the event of an
"occurrence" and "immediately" when "claim is made or suit is brought."' 2
Similarly, when notice must be given reasonably, some jurisdictions con-
sider the insured's sophistication to assess reasonableness." 3
Not all courts find a distinction based upon the insured's sophistication
compelling in the area of notice or defective tender.' 14 These courts reject
factor"); Akazar, 982 S.W.2d at 855 (collecting cases and calling the factor approach "analyt-
ically flawed" because prejudice to the insurer is not a factor in assessing the insured's excusable
conduct and the approach could lead to confusion that is detrimental to the insured).
111. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 105 E3d 778 (1st Cir. 1997)
(concluding that under Massachusetts law, notice-prejudice rule is inapplicable to a fidelity
bond issued to a sophisticated financial institution). Cf. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Virgin Islands En-
ters., Inc., 264 E Supp. 2d 261 (D.V.I. 2003) (holding that an insurance company is a so-
phisticated insured and its pre-tender expenses were not recoverable from a car rental com-
pany co-defendant); Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Beatrice Cos., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 861 (N.D.
ill. 1996) (noting that "at least between sophisticated parties," pre-tender defense costs are
not subject to a notice-prejudice rule).
112. Avco Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 679 A.2d 323, 329-30 (RI. 1996).
113. See Amerisure Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (under Illinois law, noting that insured, a
corporation with over 100 employees and annual sales over $10 million was "sophisticated
with regard to commerce and insurance"); Am. Country Ins. Co., 682 N.E.2d at 370 (explaining
that factors in assessing reasonableness of notice include prejudice to the insurer, "the so-
phistication of the insured regarding insurance policies," "the insured's awareness that an
occurrence as defined under the terms of the policy has taken place," and "the insured's
diligence in ascertaining whether policy coverage is available"). Still other jurisdictions have
limited the application of the notice-prejudice rule in the commercial insurance context. See,
e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 773 E2d 15 (1st Cir. 1985); Cheschi v. Boston Edison
Co., 654 N.E.2d 48, 53 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
114. Carrington Estate Planning Servs. v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 644
(9th Cir. 2002 (noting that the notice-prejudice rule applies regardless of the insured's so-
phistication); Trustees of the Univ. of Pa. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 815 E2d 890, 898 (3d Cir.
1987) (extending notice-prejudice rule to policies between sophisticated parties); Federated
Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 668 N.E.2d 627, 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(rejecting policy's written tender requirement and holding "that an insurer's duty to defend
claims potentially falling within the terms of a policy is triggered by actual notice of a lawsuit,
regardless of whether the insured is sophisticated or unsophisticated-provided the insured
has not selected one insurer to provide an exclusive defense and there is no prejudice to the
insurer"). See also British Ins. Co. of Cayman v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 146 E Supp. 2d 585,
593 (D.N.J. 2001) (noting that reinsurance is not adhesionary; thus, the reinsured "cannot
argue that the policy behind the prejudice rule applies to reinsurance contracts"), rev'd, 335
F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2002) (overruling lower court and concluding that even between so-
phisticated insurance companies, "New Jersey Supreme Court would require the reinsurer
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the invitation to depart from notice-prejudice rules even as to sophisticated
insureds because "it results in the insured forfeiting coverage it has already
paid for"' I' and in the case of defective tender, where an insurer has actual
notice of the claim but no formal tender of it, placing the burden to clarify
the intent of the insured "facilitate[s] clear communication between the
parties."116 After all, an insurer with notice of a claim "can simply ask the
insured if the insurer's involvement is desired, thus eliminating any uncer-
tainty on the question."" 7
The mere sophistication of the insured does not justify abandoning
notice-prejudice rules. Forfeiture is just as harsh for a sophisticated insured
as for any other insured and the presence or lack of prejudice on the insured
is equally felt. In addition, like ordinary insureds, sophisticated insureds
can be ignorant about the existence or nature of their insurance coverage." 8
The notice-prejudice rule is a judicial creation designed to protect the
insured public by creating a doctrine to ameliorate the effect of noncom-
pliance with technical notice/tender provisions unilaterally imposed on
insureds in insurance policies. Carving out an exception based on the in-
sured's status raises inequality problems in jurisdictions with a notice-
prejudice rule, without a sound rationale.
On the other hand, the notice-prejudice rule is inapt when the insured
has actually made a strategic decision to forgo coverage. An insured has a
"paramount ... right to choose or knowingly forgo an insurer's partici-
pation in a claim" and "may knowingly forgo the insurer's assistance by
instructing the insurer not to involve itself in litigation."' 9 An insured may
to demonstrate prejudice where, as here, the reinsurer relies on late notice as a defense against
the otherwise legitimate claims of its reinsured"); Cincinnati Cos. v. W Am. Ins. Co., 701
N.E.2d 499, 504 (I1. 1998) ("the better rule is on which allows actual notice of a claim to
trigger the insurer's duty to defend, irrespective of the level of the insured's sophistication,
except where the insured has knowingly foregone the insurer's assistance"); Loosmore v.
Parent, 613 N.W2d 923 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (placing the burden on the insurer to clarify
an ambiguous tender, even where the insured is a sophisticated entity).
115. British Ins. Co. of Cayman, 335 E3d at 205.
116. Home Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh, 658 N.W2d 522, 533 (Minn.
2003) (citing Towne Realty, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 548 N.W2d 64, 67 (Wis. 1996)).
117. Id. at 533 (citing Cincinnati Cos., 701 N.E.2d at 504).
118. Amerisure Ins. Co., 2 E Supp. 2d at 296, illustrates that even a sophisticated insured
can be ignorant. There, insured was sued for patent violations under the Lanham Act. The
insured consulted its general counsel, an attorney at a law firm employing approximately
seventy employees. With advice from its general counsel, the insured also sought a patent
litigation firm to represent it. In interviews with prospective law firms, the question arose
whether the claim might be covered by insurance, but the insured's general counsel said, "No,
of course not. It is patent litigation." Id. at 300. Seven months later, patent attorneys at Baker
& McKenzie first determined that the insured "should give notice of the action to [its] in-
surers." Under a "prejudice" analysis, the court did not excuse the late notice, concluding
that the insured was a sophisticated corporation represented by two law firms and failed to
exercise due diligence. Id. at 305.
119. Home Ins. Co., 658 N.W2d at 522 (citing Richard Marker Assocs. v. Pekin Ins. Co.,
743 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)).
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forgo a defense with one carrier because other insurance exists, or because
the insured wants to proceed with its own defense.2 0 The insured's so-
phistication and experience may be relevant to determining whether its
failure to give notice was a conscious strategic decision or the result of
mere ignorance or neglect. 2 '
C. Waiving Formal Statutory Requirements
Insurers have also sought to excuse their own lapses when the other party
is sophisticated. For example, in many states, insurers are required to make
a written offer of uninsured'22 and underinsured23 motorist coverage to
insureds and, in some states, the statutes specify how the offer of coverage
is to be made and the manner in which an insured may decline such cov-
erage. Without a proper offer of coverage, the insured will be deemed not
to have waived the optional coverage, and so coverage will be imputed.
I2 4
These cases typically arise where an insured is an employer and the
injured party is an employee or passenger to whom the insured employer
has no tort liability. Thus, UM/UIM insurance coverage is not particularly
advantageous to the employer-insured, and when the insurer attempts to
show that the employer knowingly waived such coverage, even though it
was not properly offered, the employer does not object to the insurer's
position. The employer-insured may even concede that it did not desire
such coverage. The injured employee desires the coverage as a beneficiary
under the policy and is left to argue what logically ought to be the insured
employer's position in favor of UM/UIM coverage.
Many courts have established a bright line approach and require strict
adherence to the statutory requirements of offer and waiver of coverage,
even when the insured is a sophisticated entity that knowingly waived
coverage.' 25 For example, in Estate of Ball v. American Motorists Insurance
120. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 994 E2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that where an insured is covered under several policies, the sophisticated insured may
rationally conclude that representation by one insurer better suited his defense than repre-
sentation by another).
121. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. James McHugh Constr. Co., 144 E3d 1097,
1103-04 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence that risk manager wrote that insured was
"expressly electing to tender the defense and indemnity of this case to you, and not to our
other carrier" constituted a targeted tender, and notice-prejudice rule was inapplicable); Erie
Ins. Exch. v. Virgin Islands Enterps., Inc., 264 E Supp. 2d 261, 264 (D.V.I. 2003) (holding as
to pre-tender costs that in the case of a sophisticated insured having multiple coverages, "it
was reasonable for Avis to conclude that [the insureds] wanted Erie to defend them rather
than Avis").
122. Hereinafter UM.
123. Hereinafter UIM.
124. See, e.g., Ammons v. Transp. Ins. Co., 219 E Supp. 2d 885 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
125. See, e.g., id. at 894-95 (holding that an insurer's failure to comply with statutory
requirements for offering optional UM coverage precluded waiver regardless of insured's
status as a "sophisticated, corporate consumer[]"); Bernier v. Transam. Ins. Co., 574 N.E.2d
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Co., 126 decedent Jennifer Ball was employed by the insured, a national food
service corporation with a fleet of 3,000 vehicles in twenty states. 27 A drunk
driver killed Ball while she was driving a company vehicle in Arizona. Ball's
estate sought UIM coverage under Fleming's policy with American Mo-
torists Insurance Company. The insurer rejected the claim on the grounds
that Fleming had not purchased UIM coverage. Fleming's risk manager,
when soliciting bids from insurers, had indicated that Fleming only wanted
that insurance required by state law. 28 The policy issued afforded $3 mil-
lion in liability coverage but nothing in UIM coverage. Arizona law re-
quires all insurers writing automobile policies to make a written offer to
insureds of LJIM coverage in the amount of the liability coverage under
the policy, but also allows insureds to decline properly offered coverage. 29
The insurer conceded that it had not complied with the statutory written
offer rule, but contended that Fleming, as a "sophisticated business with a
professional risk manager, knew what it wanted, and made a knowing
waiver."130 After the accident, Fleming agreed with the insurer that cov-
erage was not desired. The Arizona Supreme Court, en banc, rejected the
insurer's position:
Allowing the insurer and named insured to agree to facts and the legal signif-
icance of documents after the claim arises defeats the protective purpose of
the statute. It lets the insurer and named insured bind a person insured under
the policy to their post-claim statement of facts. But it is this person, the driver,
that the statute was designed to protect.'
Recently, a few courts have reached an opposite conclusion, concluding
that a sophisticated insured can make a knowing waiver of coverage, even
if the statutory provisions are not strictly met.'32 For example, in Lumber-
873 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., v. Irex Corp., 713 A.2d 1145 (Pa. Super.
1998) (imputing coverage where insurer fails to comply with UM/UIM statutory require-
ments even though evidence suggested vice president intended to reject coverage); Clements
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 850 P.2d 1298 (Wash. 1993) (adopting a bright line test requiring
insurer to conform to statute, even though corporate risk manager stated that employer did
not want UIM coverage).
126. 888 P.2d 1311 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc).
127. Id. at 1311-12.
128. Id. at 1312.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1312-13.
131. Id. at 1313.
132. See, e.g., McDonald v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. CV
0005955175, 2002 WL 495126, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2002) (holding that strict
adherence to statutory provisions for reducing UM/UIM coverage is not required on a com-
mercial fleet policy, noting that "decisions regarding commercial coverage limits are generally
made by professionals who have a degree of sophistication in such matters" ... and "if ad-
herence had been precise in this case ... it is absolutely clear that the result would have been
the same"); Manalo v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., No. 19391, 2003 WL 264344 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 7, 2003) (holding that where the named insured, Avon, is a sophisticated large
corporation and its risk manager states that he knowingly selected particular coverage, precise
form of offer and rejection prescribed by case law is not required); Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Sowell, No. 00-CP-24-713, 2002 WL 864241 (S.C. C.P. Apr. 26, 2002).
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mens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Sowell,' 1 at issue was whether an automobile
policy issued by Lumbermens to SmithKline Beecham contained UIM
coverage. Lumbermens' offer of UIM coverage failed to comply with stat-
utory requirements because it did not to list the premium prices for UIM
coverage on the form. However, SmithKline's risk manger stated that he
had had no intention of buying UIM coverage, that he was familiar with
the policy and UIM coverage, and that he "ma[de] no claims of misunder-
standing or ignorance in the rejection of the UIM insurance."' 3 4 The court
explained,
Looking at the UIM cases that have been before the Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals, the insured claims ignorance or failure to inform on the part of
the insurance company. The insured claims that had he known of his options
or that UIM coverage existed, he would not have rejected coverage .... These
insured are not sophisticated business entities. However, the insured in the
case before the court is a sophisticated business entity. Also, the insured does
not claim that its insurance company failed to make a meaningful offer.
... The person intended to be protected by Section 38-77-350, which is
SmithKline, has been protected. While this court can find no exception to
Section 38-77-350, the public policy that drives the existence of the code
section cannot be served by reforming the insurance contract at hand. 3 '
Thus, unlike Arizona, this South Carolina court viewed the statutory
provisions. as inuring a benefit to the policyholder and not to benefici-
aries under the policy. The South Carolina court also considered that
SmithKline's knowing waiver achieved the statute's purpose, even if the
statutory requirements were not met.
Carving out a status-based 'exception to the statutory requirement im-
posed on insurers to offer certain coverage is unjustified. These statutes
were designed for the protection of the insured public, to make sure that
all insureds are offered UM/UIM coverage because it is valuable insurance.
Creating an exception to the statutory requirement for sophisticated in-
sureds that knowingly forgo coverage raises the same equality questions
that interpreting standardized agreements poses. By turning waiver into a
factual issue rather than a matter of statutory compliance, courts circum-
vent the legislative design to protect insurance consumers by establishing
a clear prophylactic rule.136 What would next prevent a court from negating
133. Sowell, 2002 VL 864241, at *1.
134. Id. at * 1. Undoubtedly SmithKline took the position that it did not want coverage
because it had no liability to its injured employee who was seeking the UIM coverage under
the policy.
135. Id. at**2-3.
136. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 211, cmt. e ("In the case of a public
utility, that assumption is fortified by statutory and common law limitations on discrimination
among customers; a term prescribed by statute or regulation in the case of an insurance policy
also carries an assurance of equal treatment.").
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the rule in every case where any insured knowingly waived coverage despite
the insurer's failure to comply, thus eviscerating the statute? The legislature
sought to avoid the problems created by making each case of waiver a
factual dispute by requiring insurers to abide by certain formalities. In this
instance, invoking a sophisticated insured exception undermines the uni-
formity of law that the legislature desired.
IV. THE INSURED'S SOPHISTICATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
ONLY WHEN THE DISPUTE IS FACTUAL
No doubt insurers will continue to urge courts to consider the insured's
sophistication when resolving disputes where traditional rules attempt to
equalize the imbalance of power between the consumer and the insurer.
The rules created by courts and statutes to protect the insured public and
to promote sound public policy are not less applicable merely because an
insured is a commercial entity with wealth and sophistication. Altering
these rules based on the insured's status threatens mischief where predict-
ability, equality, and uniformity are desirable.
In the case of standardized agreements or terms, applying a sophisticated
insured exception to contra proferentem means that the sophisticated in-
sured obtains a different product than other insureds when choosing stan-
dardized language, although that was not the intent of the parties. Treating
insureds differently in this situation undermines the desirability of stan-
dardization of the provisions. It gives sophisticated insureds inferior prod-
uct and treats them differently from other insureds. Similarly, the notice-
prejudice rule is a judicial creation to protect insureds from technical,
unilateral notice provisions in an insurance contract where forfeiture will
result and there is no harm to the insurer. The public policy behind these
rules is equally compelling regardless of the status of the insured. Finally,
statutory written waiver requirements of UM/UIM coverage represent a
legislative scheme designed to assure that the motoring public is offered
particular valuable insurance and are afforded the opportunity to decline
coverage after meaningful deliberation. The rule's rigidity is desirable to
both insured and insurer, because by mandating a clear offer and waiver of
coverage, the insured can make a knowing decision and the insurer will
clearly know what coverage is provided under the policy, thus avoiding
disputes about intent. An exception here undermines the legislature by
creating a factual question of waiver where the legislature desired certainty.
Consideration of the insured's sophistication has a place in insurance
law, however, when the dispute is factual and there is no danger of incon-
sistency, inequality, and uncertainty. Thus, when equal parties jointly draft
nonstandardized insurance language, considering the sophistication of the
parties is merely an aid in interpretation and does not have implications
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outside of that case. Similarly, when deciding whether the insured's delay
or defect in notice or tender was the result of ignorance or represented a
conscious choice to forgo coverage, the insured's knowledge, experience,
and understanding of insurance lends insight into the insured's conduct
and should be considered.
V. CONCLUSION
There is little to justify changing long-held principles of insurance contract
interpretation and treating insureds differently based on their wealth, size,
or power alone. The pro-insured rules are not premised merely on these
inequalities. Among other reasons, they also represent a judicial bias toward
coverage based on public policy considerations. The functional approach
proposed by Professor Stempel has become a dominant approach in de-
ciding when to abandon these traditional rules. One caveat remains: when-
ever the language is standardized, regardless of who offered it or how much
negotiation occurred, it should be interpreted consistently with how it is
interpreted generally. This includes the contra proferentem bias. This lim-
itation is justified where parties selecting standard language expect courts
to apply standard interpretation consistent with other cases. By individu-
alizing the interpretation of standardized language, courts allow the pos-
sibility of an opportunistic advantage unintended by the parties. The in-
equality, inconsistency, and unpredictability of individualizing the
interpretation of standard insurance language are not desirable.
In the context of statutory mandates and notice-prejudice rules, it is
undesirable for courts to depart from insurance rules aimed at protecting
the insured public generally for certain classes of insureds, because doing
so undermines the desirable goals of uniformity in interpretation, predict-
ability of judicial outcomes, and equal treatment among insureds.
There is a place, however, for considering the sophistication of insureds
in the context of ascribing a meaning to the conduct of a party. When
disputes between insureds and insurers are factual and resolution depends
upon determining what these parties meant with regard to their own
unique dispute, consideration of the insured's sophistication is a useful and
illuminating tool.

